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NEW DIRECTIONS IN ECONOMIC POLlCY. 
A consensus of sorts would appear to have been reached in the 
UK that the control of pay is central to the achievement of a return to full 
employment. This is explicit in the Alllance proposals for a tax-based 
incomes policy and implicit in the Labour Party's requirement of voluntary 
cooperation from unions in any future expansionary measures. For the 
government it has until recently taken the form of deregulating the labour 
market and leaving the discipline of competition to control payo More 
recently they have embarked on a course . charted by Professor 
Weitzman, to change the ínstitutional basis of the remuneration system 
itself. The consensus is obviously far flung but certainly gone are the heady 
days of Orthodox Keynesian economics when unemployment could be 
mopped up by a general-ref1ation of demand alone. -Gone also are the 10ft Y 
fJretensions of Monetarists that following a prescribed growth in the money 
sUfJply path will suffice to ensure stable growth of nominal demand and 
permit full employment at stable prices. The 1970's experience of fuelled 
(only partially carbon-basedl inflation hit the first one on the head and the 
1980's experience of sustained high unemployment within a setting of 
substantially steady growth in nominal demand (and of course unsteady 
growth of money supply measurad by the b-road aggregate f.M3 1 has 
caused a rethink of the second. If we split the growth of nominal "GDP into 
its -real and inflation components {orrecent years it is ciear that it has been 
quite sufficient to rapidly reduce unemployment were it not for the fact 
that wagerises stubbornly persist at over 7r. per annum and hence 
channel demand into higher pay and prices rather than into extra 
employment and output growth. 
ihe New Keynesianism has eschewed fine tuning of demand for 
employment purposes for a steady and moderate growth of money 
expenditures. This is no different to the objectives of the MTFS but with 
the operational difference that monetary control is no more than a 
component of the package that does not subordinate fiscal policy. This is 
married with a wide range of wage fixing policies torestrain money costs 
anó cnannel dle monay Jemand ;5fOWth lUto ·Jmput ;md ,~mpioómÉm 
growth. This is a reversal of the previous assignment in which demand was 
to be varied to sustain fuH employment and incames policies were brought 
in to hold inflation under control. It is on the need for wage fixing policíes 
that has marred a full reconciliation of government and opposition views. 
lndeed in recent years the popular debate has been remarkably 
polariseó with the ChanceHors assertion that the real wage lS too high to 
make extra output profitable for tirms anó that al::' reduction in it wouló 
result . in time, with al::. expansion in employment. For him 
unemployment is classical anó not de manó dendent. New Keynesians 
vould c;ounter [hat le :si.he rnplo:;;rowt!1 ·}f :nonev wages ,hat Iimits :1 
demand expansion ana gives llS :l nign NAIRU ana thaL slowing this down 
------------------------------------------------- - . 
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would not matertally aHect real wages. For them the money wage IS the 
outcome of collective bargaining and real wages are determined by the 
ensuing priee markup. lt is the level o[ unemployment that ensures thal 
the real wage demanded by workers i3 consistent with the real wage 
determined in this way. The real wage i3 not determined within the labour 
market- and it i3 anyway of only secondary importanee becau3e it is 
endogeneous to the interaction of markets along with the level of output 
which it i5 purported by the Chancel!or to explain. In this the New 
Keynesians are most certainJy right. A reduction in money wages (or more 
r,ealisticaliy their rate of growth) is anyway the only practicable means 
available to the present government of reducing real wages (their rate of 
growth) since ci,ise in the peiee leve! rather conflicts with their objectives 
on inflation control. Apart [rom reducing the component due to inflationary 
expectations it i5 c1ear that the government has not pre3ided over a 
moderation in money wage growth. A Treasury simulation suggests tha! ir 
it could then real wages would be lower and employment higher given a 
constant leve! of money demando But the main drive comes [rom the higher 
real demand because of the consequent fal! in prices. In combination Wilh a 
higher monetary demand the same simulation generates a far stronger 
reduction in unemployment. 
In his 1986 budget Nigel Lawson made a declaration of intent to 
free up the labour market. in it he embraced the ideas of Martin Weitzman 
- outlined in his book the share economy. The fact that Weitzman is a 
reconstucted Keynesian further emphasises the convergence in thinking 
previously mentioned but in contrast Weitzman does not see the adoption 
of his p'¡an as leading to a reduction in real wages under present 
circumstances .. The Cact that Weitzman is an American economist (hailed by 
the New York Times as providing possib1y 'the most important contribution 
to economic thought since John Maynard Keynes's General Theory·) 
interestingly continues a tradition of applying the ideas of American Guru·s 
to policy making in the United Kingdom. The notable thing about the 1987 
budget statement for me was the way Weitzman stepped in and Milton 
Friedman was thrown out. Who said there 1S no alternative? Let us now 
turn to the ideas of the share economv. 
THE SHARE ECONOMY. 
In common with other Keynesians Weitzman sees the ~conomó 
as behaving badly in response to a shock in demand of the kínd 
experienced in the UK in1980/81 (when there was a very sharp reduction 
in the rate of growth of nominal GDP). Rigidity in money wages (or their 
rate of growth) causes predominantly quantity rather than price 
adjustments in the shoet run (which might be quite extended). But he 
argues that this resuit arises because oí" the remuneration system 
empioyed-the wage system- in which a workers income is prÉdÉt~rminÉd 
and independent o[ any index of a firros we!1-being. Should remuneration 
;,e :¡ea t.o :lueh an lfldex ¡hen a cao1l.aJist economv wouia (unCllon al fuil 
empioymem , impervious to such shock s, - indeed a Keynesian economy 
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would be transformed into one simulating Classieal behaviour! 
"., To get the flavour of his argument , and perhaps to appredate 
its origins, it is useful to eonsider the theoretieal framework in his book 
and his 1985 AER arüele. This is one of an imperfeetly eompetitive set of 
firms in goods markets, each fadng a perfeetly elastie supply of labour. 
r'¡"j' "A r) 1 ........ 
q 
~xc€'ss sr.tppl y 
... 
output. 
mK8:rgKi1'lK~1 
cüst 
Being imperfectly competitive profit maxlmlsmg firms will 
equate MR to MC at a level of output for which price excceeds marginal 
cost. Each firm would like to se11 more at i1's profit-maximising priee but is 
constrained by a lack of buyers. Such a firm does not have a supply curve 
in the usual sense but it 1s as though it experiences an excess supply of 
output. It will not be profitable for it to eliminate this excess supply by 
price adjustment but insted it will court the consumer by advertising and 
cultivating brand loyaUy thraugh customer friendly policies Cthe customer 
i:; always righn Indeed aHhough the consumer 1s sovereign in a perfectly 
competitive world insofar as consumers dictate the structure of output,he 
is much more roya11y treated in an imperfec1y competitive world because a 
red carpet is thrown out to greet him. Workers on the other hand are paid 
their MRP and are treated with some indifference by employers because at 
the margin they contribute to the firm exactly what they take from it. 
r..'luctuations in ?roduct demand will be met :w '1iring and fíringJf wE)rkÉr~ 
as MRP varíes aginst the fixed wage. If , as many studíes suggest , MC is 
constant over a wide range of output and also demand is iso-elastic then 
nuctuations in product demand will be met by varying output at an 
unchang-ed market price. We have the simple orthodox lCeynesian model in 
microcosmo As the composition of consumer budgets change so firms in 
declining markets will ¡ay off workers who will be absorbed by firms in 
expanding markets. Labour i3 reallocated. as Reddaway round, 
predominately by job availability. Some categories of worker may find 
themseJves in excess suppJy ir their relative wages do not adjust but the 
mechanism does 'Voriz 'VeH and reallocated ~abour on 'él massive scale 
l,hrougnout l.he prosperous 1950's and 1960·s. ,out tn the [ace of a raíl in 
aggregate demand many fiems would be laying off workers and reducing 
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output unLiI the multlpHer process was exhausted tn so me new 
under-employment equilibrium. In that state firms would 3ti11 be 
IOdifferent to their workforces (W =MRP) at the margin but a [ortiori they 
would be unaffected by the availability o[ the unemployed. Only when 
wages have fallen will individual employers Wi3h to hire more worker3. Of 
cour3e the usual reservations apply namely the redistribution of ¡ncome 
involved may further weaken aggregate demand and hence individual firm 
demands and anyway money wages may take some time to adjust. 
So how can a simple change in the remuneration system 
fundamentally alter these response characteristics? As a student of 
planned economies Weitzman was we11 aware of the contrast between the 
elcess ctemand [or consumer goods in soviet economíes and the excess 
supply that characterises the west. If you want to make firms queue up for 
labour rather than see a dole queue of workers then you must make the 
marginal cost of labour low relative to its MRP.preferably zero. or course 
this would involve a massive increase in realised pronts ir only demand 
held up to huy the same output and workers could be induced 1,0 supply 
the same labour. Both could be assured if apure profits tax could be levied 
on firms and redistributed in favour of workers in proportion to their 
former earnings.Unlikely as this may seem it is isomorphic to apure 
profit-related pay scheme - a watered down example of - which was 
introduced by Nigel lawson in his 1987 bUdget proposals. Like olher 
schemes that have gone before it designed to give workers a stake in their 
firm, this one might be expected to pro mote an identification of workers 
with their firms and improve motivation and productivity but more 
importanUy it removes the indifference of employers to their workforce. 
Some share ownership schemes can provide a source of finance for firms 
and workers as capitalists will be courted but in this scheme they wi11 be 
desired in their role as workers. If a11 firms paid only profit shares then . at 
full employment. they would each have an elcess demand for workers. 
Paradoxically the government that has most laid to rest the 
concept of full employment as a policy objective is flirting with a proposal 
which, if taken to the limit would provide full employment in a sense 
never real1v el::lerienced in che UK even drfin~ the ?rosperous 1950's and 
60's. WiHiam Beveridge argued that "CuH employmenL ..... means 
always having more vacant jobs than unemployed men ........... It 
means tl1at Lile johs are at rair vages. oC such a I::ind, and so 
located that Lhe unemployed men can reasonably be expected to 
tate them; it means by consequence, that the normal lag 
betveen losing ones job and flnding llnother vil! be very short. 
rhe proposition ....... means that tlle tabour martet should alvavs 
be a seBers marte! fllther than a Duyer:'! mllrket"(Full Employment 
in a Free Society, 19-45). The average duration of unempioyment has been 
in eIcess of one year even during the Tuil emplovment' 1950's and 60's in 
,he UKi 
A [aH in the demand for an individual firms output would not 
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cause it to lay off workers because its shareholders would lose a part of 
any value -added that was lost. Instead it would cut its prices so long as 
the MRP was still positive. Workers remuneration would faH since they 
have a fixed share of a declining pie and they are the same in number. 
Hence some of thero will voluntarily leave to join other firms that are eager 
to employ them at the competitive remuneration. This process will 
continue until the MRP and remuneration in the declining firm was 
restored. Labour will voluntarily reallocate itself in response to the 
changed product demando Utopian isn't it! 
The result does not hang on going fully over to a share system, 
it occurs wherever a significant part of a workers remuneration is Hed to 
the fortunes of the firro. For example if workers in a rirm receive [,100 per 
week u¡lder a standard wage contract and the average revenue product of 
labour is f,200 (value added per man) then a switch to a base wage of say 
f,50 plus a 50\ share oC operating profits (f, 1 00 per worker) to be split up 
amongst the workforce wil1 leave workers indifferent between the two 
contracts.Remuneration per worker is now equal to:-
B + s {R- B.E)/E where B-base wage 
s - the negotiated profit share 
R = firm revenue 
E - employment 
But froro the firms point of view an extra worker wil! now add f, 1 00 to 
revenues but only f,75 to costs (f,50 base wage + RM~ of the extra operating 
profits of f,50).It can therefore add f,25 to shareholders pronts by taking 
laboUf demand 
::: 1fF:P 
Employment 
on an extra man and increasing output. Notice that total shareholder 
profits now equai R - E.E - s(R - B.E) = (l-s}(R - B.El. They are at a 
maximum when dPROFIT /dE = (!-s)([dR/dEl-B)=O ie when dR/dE = B 
In the aboye exampJe 8=f.50 so employment wil! be extended 
'Jntil MRPLd:'SO. Note Lile irrelevence of ',he share coeffícient 's' in 1.1115 - :'i 
pure ;:¡rofits lax does not arIect lhe behavlOur of !,he firmo 
Wage 
... 
M1l~rKtim pr,)lit if output redrlCp.d as itl 
a '1/'SgE' firmo 
J?xir~ úf'l?r~ti:ttg pr1jtit due tú ~h:arü~ 
b •• e vrot •• i f "«lp«1 red«ced ss in 
so 'lfagf? t1rm . 
OA = exce •• demand for labour before 
1.11 in prod«ct demand 
DE = exces" demand sftHwards 
MRP 
9fter demaro 1.11 
) d •• ired employmont (.hare limv 
-----11 desired employment (wage firm) 
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We can loak more formally at the macroecono0l1cs oC sharing e with 
Weitzman"s 1985 AER model;-
Let aggregate detMnd be gi ~tl by V= IX A + B.t1. wh.re 
P 
A= aulonomaus spending 
M/P= reol money balances 
Let aggreg.te output be g¡von by '1= 1:;(L -F) 
(E.ch firm;" • microcosm of trus). 
O< , B arp. the usual multipliers 
where 1:; =I1PL 
L = employmeftt 
F = o~rhÉad l.t,oltr 
Le! V" and L" be fixed levels of full emplolJment. output and employm.ot 
respectively so Ihal V ~ V" 
cndi~i* 
For simplieity let 11 be the common mork-up "oeffidenl for eoeh firm (= el(e-O) 
Lel 1;1 be the \\'\lge paid. For & \\'\lge system trus i" totol rem«t\<?rotiotl but lor a 
share system it i" the lo~r base \\'\lge. . 
F or ~och firm MR = P 111 cnd Me = "11 11:; . Profil maximisation requires P = fl "11 h . 
a~finK the tautness of ihe systern os, t :; V-V'" .'here t ) o represents excess demond 
for lobour 
ond t < o ropresenis excess supply. 
Note thot fer positi"e jauiness the ecenomy b.haves clcssicallu with P determiMd by 
putting V* ioto the aggregot.e demond equotion . For negative toutness w. hove a Keynesian 
uod€"recmoloume-nt eOlJilibrium \\'"i'i:h P IJnaffect€rd bl.,! r;¡ovt Dolicq Éxc~ot vio "·lOg€'S. 
For negauve tautness it 1S deOland that determines output and tile lower 1S 
tile base wage the greater the desired output of [irOlS. If the base wage 1s 
sufficienUy low and Olost firOls use a s.hare systeOl then the econoOly will 
typically operate at fuH emploYOlent with elcess demand for labour. A 
wage systeOl will typically operate in the negative tautness region where 
Olarupulation of 'A' and 'M' will allow a boast to real output ir only the 
Oloney wage could be taken as given. Wage pus.h (or adverse supply) 
shock s will raise prices and reduce reai demand and output. Under a sb.are 
systeOl, with positive tautness, successful wage pU5il in an individual firm 
will cause it to elpand its eOlployment and output. This is because it 
expenences an elcess demand ¡"or laoour I making H want to SUCK in more 
workers! and tile higher tilan competitive wage now being o[fered acts as a 
~JJ~=JJJ~JJ~~~JJ~JJJJ~JJJJJJJJJJ
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magnet to workers in other share firms. rhe higher output must be sold at 
a lower price and the process will continue until workers total 
remuneration i3 reduced to the competitive leve!. Note the contrasto Wage 
push in a wage system will not raise the real wage but it is individually 
rationa! for any one group of workers to attempt it (since if others do not 
the pushing group would experience higher real wages). In a share system 
wage push by an individual group of workers is irrational. lt will be 
undermined by dilution of the profit share and will only weaken the firmo 
But if all workers did it in tandem they would arguably succeed. 
Short -run behaviour of both systems. 
variable ! r < O t > O 
, 
, 
y (both systems) ocA + f3M ~ Y* JlW 
P (both sy st.ms) JlW f3M 
J~J (Y*-ocA) 
W /P ("'oo. ~ W(Y*-oc,Á.) -
syst.m) Jl 13M 
w / p (orofit- (1-s )~ +sY (l-s)W(Y*-ocA) +sY* 
sharioQ - 13M L* system) Jl L 
In the long run both systems converge to the same full 
employment leve! of output, employment and real wages (money wages on 
the one hand and base wages and share parameters on the other will 
adjust to remove any disequllibrium). rhis seems plausible enough and will 
not be considered here. One qualification is that if the share system 
enhances identification of workers with their firms and i5 more prone to 
be at full employment the n investment migbt be rugher with the long run 
consequences that trus entails. 
THE LA WSON PROPOSALS. 
LN -rHE ilUDGiIT QF ;\¡lARGi i 987 tí1ewlam:ellor proposea;na¡; 
haIf of profit-related pay (PRP) will be free of income tax up to the point 
where PRP is 20," of pay or f.3000 pa, wruchever is lower. For a married 
man on average pay the relief would add about f.6 per week to take-home 
pay#, equivalent to 4p off the basic rate of income tax. rhe relief will be 
available to aH private sector employees paying income tax through PAYE 
provided that they are inc1uded in a PRP scheme registered by tlleir 
empioyer with t.he In!and Revenue. For a scheme to qualify for tax relief ít 
must (a)snow a c1ear link between audited profits and PRP. 
':01: ¡)l' C:lO.OtlO - ClOOO !?RP. ~:ooo WOULD BE mmMPT :"ROM !l\1COMETAJt " 27::. :1AK1NG A 
TA1SAV!NGO!':f.270 FA. 
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(b)New recruits and part-timers may be excluded, but al least 
8M~ of the' other employees in the employment unit must be 
covered by the PRP scheme. 
(c)Prospective PRP must be at least R~ of the total pay of 
participating employees. 
(d)A scheme must last for at least one year. 
The proposals mooted by the Chancellor at the NEDC meeting of 
May 1986 had involved a significant proportion of income being 
profit-related in order to get tal reHef (a Weitzman sized 2M~ being quoted 
in an eumple) and heo.ce involved a wholesale conversion of remuneration 
f-rom a wage system to a share system. This was dropped in the face of a 
widely held view amongst employers and industria! relations experts that 
it was unworkable. The'Green Papel' of July 1986 allowed a minimum of R~ 
Lo be profit -related. This was a significant innovation !lince it wil! permit 
the conversion of annual pay rises to PRP bonuses. OVer 3 01' 4 years these 
may compound until !lome 20,; of pay is profit - related. 
The original NEDC scheme al so envisaged giving tax concessions 
only to schemes lastjng for three years. This was cut back in the green 
papel' and the budget lO one year - although the government expressly 
hoped that schemes would last for severa! years. 1 will argue below that 
relating pay to profit!! for a períod of only one year js counter productive to 
the scheme although, in conjunction with the low R~ threshold level for 
PRP, jt undoubtedly makes jt more Iikely to be taken up. 
The exemption of new recruits (for up to three years) was in 
response to the expressed view that employees would resist recruitment 
under a share scheme since it dilutes their remuneration. It therefore 
introduces a discriminatory element along the lines of Meade and is 
discussed below. 
CRITICISMS OF THE SHARE ECONOMY AND PRP PROPOSALS. 
Informal evidence supporting Weitzman has so far only come 
from his critics! Saul Estrín's estimate of the labour demand equation for 
the John Lewis Partnel'ship found a wage elasticity of demand of -0.66 
:~<his 15 from [970-; 9135 data), ~J:!É emered "vages ::lnd bonus seperately ,.md 
the coeffícient on the bonus was insignificant, as it should be since it is the 
base wage according to Weitzman that fixes the marginal cost of labour. 
The bonus currently amounts to 2M~ of remuneration. " If John Lewis is 
paying average wages some 2M~ below the market rate and ma.1dng up the 
remainder in bonus, that would imply an augmentation of employment in 
the arder of 13~ of the labour force, some 4000 additional jobs." 
However '4'le JLP was easUy the hig11 paying firm in the retail 
store sector, paying some 7,; above the mean on wages alone and 2 3 ~ 
hig11er inclusive of bonus, Furthermore Estrin's study could find no 
signiflcan1. differ-ences hetween the nrocess drivinghiring decisions in John 
Lewis and in the rest of che sample (Tesco's, Marks and Spencer, 
Sainsbury's, GUS) and treatlng JLP as just one observation he found that 
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the elasticity of demand for labour was negligible. He viewed the bonus as 
"a dividend payment to the eolleetive equity holders in the partnership." In 
a normal wage eapitalist firm profit i5 a residual and it does not determine 
employment except in the long run- hence its lack of a role in the 
employment funetion. 
In a study of UK. engineering a nd metal working firms 
(1978-82) Estrín and Wilson did however tentatively find that profit 
sharing firms (21 out of a sample of 52) had ceterus paribus 13 X higher 
employment and 4" lower payo Blanchflower and Oswald (from where 1 
took these results) are doubtful of them since bonuses were typically only 
3% of pay ror share firros. But their own research suggests that profit 
sharing of a share kind has no employment effects so that Estrin and 
Wilsons result, if it is not a statistical illusion, must come from the cash 
based sehemes, as advocated by Weitzman. 
Wadhani found that japanese bonuses were related to base 
wages , to corporate profits and also to bonuses in the previous year 
úndicating a bonus smoothing policy). However he doubted that the 'profit 
sharing {hat appeared to be taking place could explain the consistently 10w 
unemployment rate in japan. Whereas for Weitzman japanese firms do 
not shed labour in response to adverse shock s because labour is 
predominantly in excess demand Wadhani holds 
(althat the 'lifetime employment system' is more a consequence 
of substantial government subsidies to retained regular workers 
who are temporari1y made idle. 
(b)part-time workers who are laid off tend not to enter the 
unemployment figures 
(c)There is considerable evidence that labour is hoarded rather 
than profitably utilised in recessions. (Deviations in labour 
productivity growth from suggesting in the mid 1970,s some 5 
to 15% being surplus to requirements). 
(d)survey results suggest that the proportion of japanese firms 
who report a shortage of skilled labour is typically mueh less 
than that in the UK.. 
More'formaHy n.et,eeted ¡he Fol1owing prectictions 01 Weüzmans nodel:-
( 1 )Deviations of actual output from potential output do not 
depend on aggregate demando 
(2)Jnflation is independent of import price shocks and of wage 
push. 
Actually he tested considerably weaker versions in which these tendencies 
were neJd to be greater for Japan than for the main wage system countries 
and for pre-war Japan- which did not possess a bonus system. BroadJy he 
fínda that Japan does not differ significantJy in these respects from wage 
countries and where differences do occur they are perversely at odds with 
a mode! share economv 
As tor t,he PRP ¿¡roposals t.hemselves lt seems lo me that t,he 
original NEDC scheme was mueh better in one important respect than those 
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that followed. Fixing the profit share for one year ahead does not seem 
enough. It is nol hard to forecast profits that far and it leaves scope for a 
cosmetic scheme to be drawn up in which remuneration is determined by 
col1ective bargaining as before but it is broken down into a base and a 
share component which will gain tax eIemption with the worker bearing 
no realrisk and the firm regarding the marginal cost oC labour as total 
remuneration and not just the base wage. Presumably the scheme can be 
drawn up each year with different parameters that de facto preserve the 
wage system but take advantageof the pUblic purse. 
Only over several years is there the uncertainty which 
characterises the problem to be 30[ved. Ir the share coefflcient i3 fixed fol' a 
five year span then firms will have in mind a time path of proms (as does 
the stock market when it values it8 equity) and of the profü component it 
will be paying it3 workforce. In negotiating its base wage It will have to 
bear this profile in mind. It may wish to engage in bonus smoothing 
according to .'lome prearranged formula but, and this is the important point, 
It can't ignore that, if it i:s to stabilise remuneration, it must nI its baSe 
wage in .'lome manne!' countercyc1ical to profits. In good times then it 
would have to set base wages low and vice versa. Paradoxically this would 
make the economy oscillate between a share system in buoyant times and 
a wage system otherwise. However this would be to go to faro So long as 
workers can engage in term borrowing reasonably easily short term 
variability of income i3 less of a worry and tax incentives will pursuade 
some to take the risk. Firms wi11 not be keen to vary base wages in 
response to profits because of the usual difficulty of getting them to go 
down at the right time. Hence participant firms would be less Ilkely to 
provide cosmetic schemes over five years and are dec1aring their 
willingness to allow pay to vary with profitabillty. This would answer 
somewhat the most powerful criticism of the share economy- that firms 
choose to pay the going rate to a worker because not to do so undermines 
internal morale and productivity. In this case the pay structure itself 
enters the production function and there is some "fair' set of differentials 
that maIimises output for any given labour and capital inpuLs. Were this 
cm 30. 13 ; b.ave Juown, a ,fiare nr:n 'Vii! find ,L more proiiLabie LO 
maintain emp[oyment ( anó output and drop price) than to cut it in the 
face of dec1ining demand for iis own product. With an efficiency wage 
imposing a constraint the firm will restore normalremuneration as soon as 
possible and will not be content to see 1ts workers voluntarily drift off until 
a competitive remuneration is restored by the automatic processes of a 
share economy. Fo!" here the margina! productivity of !abour will itseif 
decline and impose !osses :)n the firm. Weilzman recognises the force 01" 
efficiency wages to undermine his system but poims out thal in the 
interim, with pay parameters [ixed , the disequilibrium response of a share 
3VSLem .í.S 2LH1 'o K~tave ful.1 ,~mc!ovmÉnt ;)!jtcUL. '''hen ~hÉ base and'lhare 
parameters are reset te preserve some glven remuneraBon W , though. the 
fírm is effectively maximising :-
TI = (1-5) (R- B.U 
5.T. '''' = B + 5(R-B.U 
L 
which is equivalent to the maximand of wage firm facing a fixed wage W, 
Max TI = (R - WU. 
Providing lirms do not Cee! compelled to maintain remuneration and 'S' 1s 
fued remuneration will automatically faH and the Cirm will have an 
incentive to raise the base wage onIy insofar as it wishes to moderate the 
outflow of workers from its plants as it adjusts to a new lower leve! of 
output. 
Fixing the share para meter though raises problems of its own, 
as Meade points out 
MEADE'S LABOUR-CAPITAL PARTNERSHIP. 
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The whole focus of Meades contribution i5 to convert any zero sum game 
elements between labour and capital into cooperative elements by changes 
in the institutional structure of the firmo Lite Weitzman he sees the wage 
firm as involving confllct of interest since for a given size of pie labour can 
only have more at the expense of capital (although there a possibüities of 
shiftim¡ the incidence on :0 consumers md. :"'1 (he case af naüonaüseu 
industries, actually creating' cooperaüve strategies playing jointIy with 
management against the tupayer). Slmílarly having a fixed slice provides 
no incentive for rabour to cooperate with capital in increasing the size of 
the pie. 
Moving in the Weitzman direction eliminates tms basic conflict 
in much the same way that giving tu aávantages te encourage ESOPS 
would appear to do. A common interest in profits is cultivated. However 
ESOPS do not 10wer the marginal cosí o[ labour to the firm and hence lack 
the direct employment creating effects of Weitzman. 
Surely , ti orofit-snarin15 offers sucn favourabie macroecouomÍc 
performance then it snould be reJativeiy easy w [aster its impiememation? 
\ 
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Unfortunateiy tÍlis is not the case because aUhough advantageous to firms 
and to workers as a who1e it i5 not nearly so attractive to existing job 
incumbent3. Por them a firm specific [aH in demand will result in an 
automatic cut in real payo Thls may be on1y a temporary disequilibrium 
phenomena (since in the longer run mobility of workers will restore 
equalisation of net advantages) but it is non the less real for aH that. Also a 
small group oC profit -sharing firms in an ocean oC wage firms wi11 beco me 
the residual employers if the economy is depressed. Recruitment dilutes 
the profit - share of existing workers but is profitable for the firms 
involved. 
The conflict of interest over recruitment rilight appear to be 
a1leviated if the worker3 tnem:leives were the ~barÉboidÉrsJ perbap!! i[ 
their pension fund were mobilised to purchase the equity. However 1t 
would then seem logical for the trustees to pursue a policy of dividend 
maximisation (where dividend - surplus per member + wage per member). 
If this were done the resulting cooperative would have an incentive to 
reduce its membership by not replacing natural wastage. e 
For eny gl 'ren Wllge dividetld per worker 18 m&xiini8ed wnen 8ttrpltt8 per worker 18 
al 8 m&ximam. Therefore the rnaximend for 8 producer cooperaUw worl1d :be:-
Ualtlini.. S = (pO -VI. -r K) gu:bjecl lo lhe production funcHon. Q =f(KJ.) • 
I. 
[~p ! i"" J =0 wherePQL =8+11'. 
P,K 
Thus in the special case of 11'=0 (pure profit-shar;ng but here in a cooperative) the firm 
will wish to eXtend Émplo~ ment un!;1 MRP wa. equated lo surplus per member. F or anu 
positive 11' it would fall short of lhis with MRP>S. . 
Ir wages are set at the competitive level (as with the Mondragon 
cooperatives) then employment would fail short of that in a capitalist 
firm.# 
A labour managed cooperative then would appear to offer less 
scope for employment than a capitalist firm and this less in turn, during 
depressed:imes , :.nan a Weit:zmansnare {irm so long ':lS insider 'Vorkers 
cannot totaily block new recruitment. ESOPS function Jike a capítalist wage 
firm unless a critica! block of votes is secured by workers and it flips into 
concero [or maximising surplus per worker. 
Moving partial1y in the ESOPS direct10n will be beneficial to 
productivity (though there are limits for large enterprises) and industrial 
reiations. Moving in the Weitzman dírection has the added promise of 
beneficia! employment effects but it introduces new conflicts whicb. were 
• The (:zct tluU it is 1101 JO ... ¡tb Mond~oo ( ... bien de!ibentely plougJu¡ 1lJ11l1"" b:zct: in ... ¡lb tne 
expnlSl obleat oí amplayment creation) pillines me 00 (O tbe ~uÉstioo oí wbether or not cultural 
racton are domUlant in explainlllg tlle 3UCCSSS oi ootn íIlontlragon ana Japan. 
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not formerly present, between workers and capital concerning recruitment 
and new investment. Going too far in either direction will be 
counterproductive ............................ so the only way is up! 
Meade suggests as a tantalising alternative the possibility o[ a 
labour capital partnership in which a capitalist wage firm whose net 
revenues are split 80:20 between labour and capital are simi.larly divided 
by giving labour share certificates to the former and capital share 
certificates to the latter(we havn't gone up yet). Both would carry rights to 
an equal dividend but the latter would be encashable whereas the former 
are to be held until retirement age unless the worker voluntarily quits 
beforehand. 
With fixed shares the firm is reluctant to engage in new 
investment because it would finance the whole of it but only receive 2M~ 
of the returns. But if new capital certificates could be issued to raise funds 
and the ensuing dividends were less than the marginal revenue product of 
new capital then al! pre-existing shareholders would gain. SymmetricaHy 
ifan extra worker could be hired by being offered sufficient Iabour 
certifica tes and the dividends on these were less than the marginal 
revenue product of labour then again aH pre-existing shareho!ders would 
benefit. The word sufficient is important. If each worker received the same 
number of certificates then , with declining MRP , an extra worker would 
gain a share that exceeded his contribution to output. But if the necessary 
number of shares to induce him to offer his services were sufficienly low 
then he wou!d be welcomed into the enterprise by capital and labour 
shareholders alike. In partiCUlar conflict between insider and outsider 
workers would be removed. The price of course is that equivalent workers 
will be receiving different rates of pay! We have a discriminating 
labour-capital partnership. The logic is that capitalists get different returns 
on their invested funds depending on when they buy llewly issued shares 
from the firmo The value of the equity of a successful venture wiH rise in 
price as its future dividends are discounted by the market rate oC return. 
New comers wil1 only be offered the market rate of return and so their 
funds wiH b uy less shares than before \( though each will receive the going 
dividend). So vhy noí trÉ~li workers differenlly too, depending r..hat;s en 
the going wage rate rather than the existing remuneration of present 
incumbents.From the firms point of view as workers retire and are 
replaced by new workers with a competitive number of labour share 
certificates then it wiH receive in the long run all the profits of its success 
for lts capital shareholders. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS. 
The scheme is cheap , even allowing for no feedback effects 
[rom higher employment. It is estimated to cost only f,SOm in the 
c"'rth""m¡'no f.]!! f;nanc'al ""ar ;"";";0 ~l'''ht oung"""' ~n "otl·mat·e 'l1' () 7'im \.J .... J.\.<....; .... ":) 'K~ ~KKKKKK ~ ,~K_ •• , .• ~":'~ ... ¡;; '. ~ ..... lt. -J,. ... '_'", ___ _ 
taJcing up the minimum 5%. But even ~ pay incrÉa~És were consolidated 
into profit shares over 3 or 4 years and a sizeable number of workers (say 
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half oC those eligible - 6m) were to engage in it with 201 PRP tthen iL 
would still only cost [, 1.6bn ,assuming each worker is on average pay al 
[, 10000. For it to achieve benefits thaugh to set against these costs the 
scheme must be eIten.:live both in its coverage and in it$ proportioa of PRP 
to total remuneration. Cosmetic schemes are less likely to occur if prafit 
schemes are fjxed more infrequenUy than for just one year and efficiency 
wage reservatioas are likely to be less forceful Lhe more extensive is 
coverage. A single profit sharing lirm would itself impose limits oa 
emplayment expansion beca use the perceived low marginal cost of labour 
understates the true costs when demotivation occurs through dilution of 
existing workers payo A critical mass of such firms would not face this 
problem because as eaen edges in (his direction to the limits of its own 
prudence they would find that the constraint was not there. As a11 fiems 
ezpand real pay should rise. 
Discriminatory provisions would be useful to remove insider -
outsider conflict and encourage eXistíag workers to welcome new comers 
from the ranks of the unemployed. But the less extensive the coveragé of 
PRP the more discriminatory these terms would have to be for scattered 
secds of PRP to become established and the more uníons, with their 
egalitarian tendencies, would oppose them. 
Coverage 15 a fortiori more essential given that, at the level of 
the individual fkm,changes in the cost of labour are Jikely to have HUle 
effect on employment even if the firm does not take demotivational errects 
serios!y. Labour demand is Jikely to be quite inelastic. Th1s may seem 
paradoxical given that product demand i3 likely to be high!y elastic for the 
fkm. But as Meade points out if , say, 10,; of the price to the consumer of 
the final product represented value added, and all of this were ¡abour cost, 
a 10% cut in the cost of labour would lead to only al'; cut in price to the 
finalconsumer and the elasticity of demand for labour would be only 10,; 
of th elasticity of demand for the final producto Only if firms producing the 
intermediate goods were to participate would employment be seriously 
stimulated. 
However herein líes the AchiHes hee1 of profit -sharing. 
Weitzro:m fee!s so confidentiy lbout the !ack of negl1tive eJements ,,O Gis 
scneme that he has tllrown dOwn the gauntlet to anyone who can find 
unfavourable errects flowing from it. The scheme wi11 either stimulate 
employment cr stall1n the lace of entrenched positions .. at a small cost to 
the Exchequer. Wadbani has taken up the gauntlet and cogentIy points out 
that (a)in a union monopoly model, since the elasticity of ¡abour 
dcmand is lower for th firro than for the lndustry 1t 1s to be 
expected t11at that uníons would bid wages u1' higher lf 
bargaining was at that ieveL"' 
ir On ¡he oth.,.- hand R.Jaci:1lW.G oí (h" !..SE ~""" ,ha/. ~rnfilJKrlarin~ i. ~ farm ~{ ",",6 lax . .'f '.he 
glutie'ty of d""",nd f".- l~j¡our .".,.-e I lllen by p"Kltin~ "1' ,,~'bó 1 % in ~ "'lile !f)'.tOOl ~ lliljOO 
... ""Id face • 1 % _play""",t ¡O<IB. Und..,. proíit-.baring I ! X dos in tlle low"," bue "'a.¡s would 
page 1 S 
(b)since each group of core workers would gain from a 
successful wage push , assuming others did not push - whereas al1 would 
gain nothing but suffer the ensuing inflation if they all did so the prisoners 
dilemma model operates to give us the worst of all possible wor!ds. 
(d)empirical1y decentralised wage . fixing 1s associated with an 
inferior inf!ation unemployment performance (Bruno and Sachs). 
This is !ess of a point against profit-sharing than a point for the 
2nd !aw oC thermodynamics. Achievement of critica! mass would bring 
about an exp!osion of wage push that causes a dgeneration to a wage 
system again as firms would eventually renegotiate share parameters and 
take the Une of least resistance by reducing the profit element. 
Tax benefits are essential for the PRP proposal to ful1y take off. 
How substantial they must be to overcome the externalities ittvoved is 
anotber matter but 1 doubt if there is any point in a half way house. 
Without the critical mass we will only have succeded in b uildlng in yet one 
more distortion into the tax. 
In the precess of building up a share system the transition wiU 
be unstable if eHgibility for tax reHef requires only a one year profit -
snaring contract put up. A paraHel can be drawn with tne attempt to get a 
share owning popular capitalismo Big discounts encourage sizeab!e numbers 
of people to take the step and stag new issues. But once released on to the 
market and shofll of their special attractions they shed their stocks 
rapidly. In a bull mllrket many will hang on convínced they have found the 
philosophers stone but when the market turns disallusionment will set in. 
And so it is with profit sharing. A variable income stream is valued less 
tnen a fixed one by risk averse individuals and hence needs a tax break to 
make 1t attractive. A falHng one wiU make tnem regret taking Margaret 
Thatchers shiHing and desert .. or at least not re1nHst. 
have Ibe lame erreet if Ibe firm is no! labou .. constrained. Hence if lhe unian cares .bau! 
employment il "ill be mOl.., expansive lo foil.,.. Ibis coune oC actian in a abare firm. 
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